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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a) & (5) 
(West 2004). 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
Issue # 1: Whether the Court of Appeals correctly construed and applied the 
parties* respective procedural burdens in affirming summary judgment in favor of Oms1 
where, after Orvis presented evidence refuting an essential element for Johnson's2 
claims, the burden shifted to Johnson, the nonmoving party, to present evidence 
demonstrating there was a genuine issue of material fact for trial relative to that element? 
This Court reviews pure questions of law for correctness. State v. Haltonu 2007 
UT 22,12, P.3d . 
Issue # 2: Whether the Court of Appeals correctly construed and applied the 
summary judgment standard in granting Orvis judgment where (1) Orvis submitted 
evidence showing Johnson's claim to a partnership interest in Orvis' businesses was 
barred by the doctrine of judicial estoppel because Johnson had testified unequivocally in 
a judgment collection proceeding with the SB A that he owned no interest in any 
partnership and successfully maintained that position by preventing the SB A from 
collecting its judgment, and (2) Johnson, the nonmoving party, failed to respond with 
U4Orvis" refers to Plaintiff and Respondent Jayson Orvis. 
2
"Johnson" refers to Defendant and Petitioner Jamis M. Johnson. 
1 
competent evidence demonstrating there was a genuine issue of material fact for trial as 
to whether he was judicially estopped from claiming such an interest? 
This Court reviews the Court of Appeals' ruling on summary judgment for 
correctness. Machock v. Fink. 2006 UT 30, ^ 8, 137 P.3d 779 
DETERMINATIVE RULE 
This case is governed by the following determinative rule: 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 563 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, 
counterclaim or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any 
time after the expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action 
or after service of a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, 
move, with or without support affidavits for a summary judgment in his 
favor upon all or any part thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, 
counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is 
sought, may, at any time, move with or without supporting affidavits for a 
summary judgment in his favor as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and 
affidavits shall be filed and served in accordance with CJA 4-501. The 
judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, 
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary 
judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of 
3The text quoted here is the text of Rule 56 at the time of Judge Hanson's decision 
in October 2004. In November 2004, Rule 56 was amended. However, the November 
2004 amendments did not materially change the Rule with regard to the issues in this 
case. The redline version of the November 2004 amendment is contained in the 
Addendum as Exhibit 1. 
2 
liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of 
damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this 
rule judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief 
asked and a trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by 
examining the pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating 
counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what material facts exist without 
substantial controversy and what material facts are actually and in good 
faith controverted. It shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts 
that appear without substantial controversy, including the extent to which 
the amount of damages or other relief is not in controversy, and directing 
such further proceedings in the action as are just. Upon the trial of the 
action the facts so specified shall be deemed established, and the trial shall 
be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. 
Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, 
shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall 
show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters 
stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof 
referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. 
The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a 
motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this 
rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of 
his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this 
rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for 
trial If he does so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be 
entered against him. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the 
affidavits of a party opposing the motion that the party cannot for reasons 
stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify the party's opposition, 
the court may refuse the application for judgment or may order a 
continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken 
or discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just. 
3 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case was filed on August 28, 2001, following Johnson's repeated assertions 
that he had a partnership interest in Orvis' credit repair businesses. [R. 1-14.] Orvis filed 
this action in the Third Judicial District Court for the State of Utah to obtain a 
declaratory judgment that Johnson has no right, claim or interest in any of Orvis' 
businesses, enterprises or entities, relating to credit repair, (the 4*Orvis' businesses^). 
[Id.] Judge Timothy R. Hanson was assigned as the presiding judge. 
Johnson filed an answer to the complaint, a counterclaim against Orvis, and a 
third party complaint against Deon Steckling, Sam Spendlove, and Victor Lawrence. [R. 
2 0-39.] Each counterclaim against Orvis and every claim against the third party 
defendants was based on Johnson's assertion that he is a partner with Orvis in Orvis' 
businesses. [Id.] 
On August 30, 2002, third party defendants Victor Lawrence and Sam Spendlove 
filed a motion for summary judgment against Johnson, which Johnson opposed. [R. 
1106-08, 1114-1233, 1469-93.] After hearing oral argument, Judge Hanson granted the 
motion. Judge Hanson ruled, inter alia, that Johnson was judicially estopped from 
asserting he was a partner in Orvis' businesses based on Johnson's testimony, in another 
judicial proceeding, denying he had any interest in any partnership. [R. 1849-51, 1924-
33.] Johnson never appealed that summary judgment, the time for appeal has long since 
4 
passed, and that judgment was not the subject of the Court of Appeals* Opinion or the 
instant appeal [R. 2638-39.] 
On March 30, 2004, Orvis filed a motion for summary judgment on the grounds 
of judicial estoppel on Orvis5 claims against Johnson and on Johnson's counterclaims 
against Orvis. [R. 1940-51, 1957-90.] On October 20, 2004, Judge Hanson granted 
Orvis' motion and, on November 23, 2004, entered a final judgment against Johnson on 
the ground of judicial estoppel. [R. 2607, 2619-22, 2623-29.] 
Johnson appealed the Judgment on December 21, 2004. [R. 2638-39.] On 
September 28, 2006, in a published Opinion, the Court of Appeals affirmed the 
Judgment, Orvis v. Johnson, 2006 UT 394, 146 P.3d 886, and thereafter denied 
Johnson's Petition for Rehearing. This Court granted Johnson's petition for writ of 
certiorari on February 12, 2007. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Johnson Denies Under Oath In A Prior Judicial Proceeding That He Had 
Any Interest In Any Partnership, Any LLC Or The Lexington Law Firm 
On September 14, 1995, Johnson was sued by the Small Business Administration 
("SB A") in the United States District Court for the District of Utah, Central Division, 
Civil No. 2:95-CV-838J. A $260,000 judgment was entered against Johnson in that case 
on September 29, 1997. [R.238L] 
On November 17, 1999, the SB A, in post-judgment supplemental proceedings in 
that action, (the "SB A proceedings") deposed Johnson to identify assets to satisfy its 
5 
judgment. [R. 2389-2484.] Before answering any questions, Johnson was sworn in by 
the court reporter, and swore to truthfully answer each of the questions. [R. 2484.] At 
the time his deposition was taken, Johnson was a licensed attorney in Utah who had 
practiced law for a number of years.4 [R. 2401, 2413.] 
In his deposition, Johnson denied, under oath, that he had any interest in any 
partnership or limited liability company: 
Q: Do you have any interest in any partnerships? 
A: No. I mean, you know, often Fll have a joint venture with someone, but I 
don't have a partnership or set up a partnership or an LLC. You know, if I 
get a deal I say, Hey, do you want to do this deal together? We'll go up to 
Summit County and buy a lot. 
Q. Any interest in any limited liability companies? 
A. No. . . . 
[R. 2424:16-2425:4 (the transcript of Johnson's SBA deposition is contained in the 
Addendum as Exhibit 2.)] When the SBA followed up with the statement: "[s]o a joint 
venture," [R. 2424:24] Johnson responded: "Yeah, you can call it that, but I don't have 
any outgoing [sic] partnerships." [R. 2424:25, 2425:1.] Johnson specifically denied 
having any interest in the major credit repair business entity — Lexington Law Firm -
with which Mr. Orvis is involved: 
4Sometime after his deposition was taken, Johnson was disbarred on unrelated 
matters. [R. 2412-2413.] See generally In re Discipline of Johnson. 2001 UT 110, 48 
P.3d 881 (affirming order of disbarment). 
6 
A. . . . Lexington Law Firms was in my name, but since that time and with 
my bar problem, I have completely relinquished any interest They paid 
me a little, made my payment, and I resigned. Now, it's listed as an 
assumed name by Jamis Johnson, they're going to have to go in and change 
that. But, you know, they're operating now without me. 
[R. 2418:4-10 (emphasis added).] Johnson did not ask to have any of these questions 
clarified, did not state that he did not understand the question and did not ask to have any 
question re-asked. Moreover, Johnson never changed or modified any of his sworn 
testimony, either during the deposition or after his testimony was transcribed. [R. 2483-
84.] 
Orvis Purchases And Becomes The Assignee Of The SBA Judgment After 
The SBA Could Not Collect From Johnson On The Judgment 
As a result of Johnson's sworn testimony that he had no interest in any partnership 
or LLC or any other asset, the SBA did not identify any asset to execute upon to satisfy 
its judgment against Johnson. [R. 2389-84.] Unable to collect on its judgment, the SBA 
sold and assigned the judgment to a third party - All Star Financial LLC - for a fraction 
of its face value on August 8, 2001. [R. 2513 (the assignment is contained in the 
Addendum as Exhibit 3).] On August 11, 2001, All Star Financial, LLC sold and 
assigned the SBA judgment to Orvis.5 [Id.] 
5To date, Orvis has likewise been unable to collect on the judgment. 
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Contrary To His Sworn Testimony, Johnson Claims In This Action He And 
Orvis Are Partners In Orvis' Businesses; Orvis Moves For Summary 
Judgment 
By 2001, Johnson was repeatedly asserting that, since 1994, he owned a 
partnership interest in Orvis' credit repair businesses. [See R. 5, ^ 23 (Compl. f^ 23); 
2267, ^ 5.] In response, on August 28, 2001, Orvis filed a declaratory judgment action 
against Johnson seeking a declaration that Johnson has no right, claim or interest in any 
of Orvis' businesses. [R. 1-14.] Johnson responded to the complaint with an answer, 
counterclaim and third part}7 complaint against Victor Lawrence, Deon Steckling and 
Sam Spendlove. [R. 20-39.] While Johnson used different labels for his numerous legal 
claims against Orvis, every one of those claims was based upon Johnson's assertion that 
he and Orvis are partners in Orvis' businesses.6 [R. 28-38.] 
After substantial discovery had been conducted in the case, Orvis on March 30, 
2004, filed a motion for summary judgment against Johnson, both with regard to Orvis' 
claims and Johnson's counterclaims against Orvis, on the ground of judicial estoppel. 
[R. 1940-51, 1957-90.] Orvis argued that Johnson was judicially estopped from claiming 
Judgment was previously entered against Johnson and in favor of defendants 
Victor Lawrence and Sam Spendlove on their motion for summary judgment on the 
grounds, inter alia, that Johnson was judicially estopped from asserting he was a partner 
in Orvis' businesses based on Johnson's testimony in the SB A judicial proceeding 
denying he had any interest in any partnership. [R. 1106-08,1114-1233, 1469-93, 1849-
51,1924-33.] That final judgment is law of the case. See, e.g.. Piacitelli v. S. Utah State 
College. 636 P.2d 1063, 1065 (Utah 1981) (stating "a final order,. . . unless reversed on 
appeal, is res judicata and binding on the[] parties"). 
8 
a partnership with Orvis in Orvis * businesses - an essential element Johnson must prove 
for all his claims — because Johnson had previously denied owning any interest in any 
partnership, LLC or Lexington Law Firm in his sworn testimony in the SBA proceeding. 
[R. 1940-51, 1957-90.] 
Johnson opposed Orvis' motion on three basic grounds: (1) Johnson's SBA 
testimony is not inconsistent with his position in this case that he is a partner with Orvis 
in Orvis' businesses; (2) if there is any ambiguity in Johnson's SBA testimony, there is a 
material issue of fact as to whether Johnson's testimony and his position in this case are 
inconsistent; and (3) the doctrine of judicial estoppel does not apply here. [R. 2257-64.] 
The sole record Johnson filed in support of his opposition to Orvis' motion for 
summary judgment was an affidavit of Jamis Johnson (contained in the Addendum as 
Exhibit 4) and Corrections Supplementing Affidavit of Jamis Johnson (contained in the 
Addendum as Exhibit 5). [R. 2266-2515, 2608-18.] The only record Johnson submitted 
relative to the issue of whether Johnson's SBA testimony was inconsistent with his 
position in this case was: (1) Johnson's actual SBA testimony, and (2) Johnson's 
statement in his affidavit that: "In his deposition, Jamis Johnson accurately 
disclosed the information requested by the SBA,'' [R. 2274, ^ 39, Addendum Exh. 3] 
including his testimony with regard to not having any interest in any partnership* 
[JL 2275,139.] 
With regard to the doctrine of judicial estoppel, Johnson argued that there were 
9 
disputed issues of material fact with regard to only three of the elements of judicial 
estoppel: (1) the same persons or privy element, (2) the same subject matter element, 
and (3) the "successfully maintained" element. [R. 2262-64.] Johnson did not file or 
rely upon any record to support his position that these three elements were in dispute. 
Johnson never raised as an issue that reliance or bad faith/mistake were required, 
disputed elements; Johnson never submitted evidence showing there were genuine issues 
of disputed fact relative to those elements. [See R. 2242-65.] 
The undisputed evidence before Judge Hanson established that the doctrine of 
judicial estoppel barred Johnson from claiming a partnership with Orvis, requiring that 
judgment be entered against Johnson on Orvis' declaratory judgment claim and on 
Johnson's counterclaims. That evidence included: (1) Johnson admitted in his affidavit 
that Orvis and the SB A were privies - "Orvis has, as the assignee of the SB A judgment. 
. ." [R. 2281, Tj 60 & 2280, fflj 52, 54, Addendum Exh. 3; R. 2513, Addendum Exh. 2];7 
(2) the post-judgment SBA proceeding was a proceeding to determine whether Johnson 
had any assets, including any interest in any partnership and this action is an action to 
determine whether Johnson has a partnership interest in Orvis' businesses; [R. 1-14, 20-
55, 2381, 2389-2484] and (3) the SBA did not execute on any partnership interest 
7There was no record as to the source of the money Orvis used to purchase the 
judgment. In particular, there was no evidence that Orvis used money from the "alleged 
partnership" to purchase the SBA judgment. There also was no record or legal authority 
demonstrating that Orvis violated any legal duty to Johnson by buying the SBA judgment 
10 
Johnson claims in this action because Johnson testified under oath in the SBA 
proceeding that he did not have any interest in any partnership. 
Judge Hanson Grants Orvis Summary Judgment Based On Judicial 
Estoppel. 
Judge Hanson heard oral argument on Orvis' motion for summary7 judgment on 
August 9, 2004. [R. 2607.] After taking the motion under advisement on October 20, 
2004, Judge Hanson entered a Minute Entry granting Orvis summary judgment on the 
ground of judicial estoppel, ruling: 
Mr. Johnson is judicially estopped from asserting that he had an interest in 
a partnership where he, in a separate proceeding under oath, testified he 
had none. There is no question of mistake. Mr. Johnson testified as he did, 
so as to avoid collection efforts from the Small Business Administration. 
The principle of judicial estoppel prohibits Mr. Johnson from in this later 
action now asserting a different position. 
[R. 2619-22 (contained in the Addendum as Exhibit 6).] 
On November 23, 2004, Judge Hanson entered a final Judgment in favor of Orvis 
and against Johnson on Orvis' claims and Johnson's counterclaims. The Judgment 
declared that "Defendant has no right, claim or interest in any business, enterprise or 
entity, relating to credit repair, in which plaintiff has any ownership interest." [R. 2631; 
2630-32 (contained in the Addendum as Exhibit 7).] Judge Hanson's decision and the 
Judgment were supported, not only by the record,8 but by findings of undisputed facts 
8Judge Hanson's decision and the Judgment were based on undisputed facts, 
including the following material facts Judge Hanson found to be undisputed: 
(1) The SBA took Johnson's deposition in post-judgment supplemental 
11 
and legal conclusions he entered the same day as the Judgment.9 [R. 2623-29 (contained 
in the Addendum as Exhibit 8).] 
The Utah Court of Appeals Affirms Judge Hanson's Decision and Judgment 
Johnson appealed the final Judgment to the Utah Court of Appeals. After full 
briefing and oral argument, the Utah Court of Appeals issued a published opinion 
proceedings in United States of America v. Jamis Johnson. 2:95-CV-838J, in the United 
States District Court for the District of Utah, on November 17, 1999, to identify assets on 
which it could execute to collect its judgment against Johnson. [R. 2627, ^ 4-5.] At his 
deposition, Johnson, under oath, denied he had any interest in any partnership, LLC, or 
Lexington Law Firm. [R. 2627-28, ^ j 5.] 
(2) Johnson's denial of any interest in any partnership, LLC or Lexington Law 
Firm was not a mistake. "Johnson testified as he did so as to avoid collection efforts by 
the SB A." [R. 2627, If 5.] 
(3) The SB A, after deposing Johnson and his wife, did not identify any asset to 
satisfy its judgment; it never collected on the judgment; and the SB A assigned the 
judgment to a third party on August 11, 2001. [R. 2625, ^  6.] 
(4) On August 11, 2001, the third party assigned the SB A judgment to Orvis. 
[R. 2625,1 7.] 
(5) Johnson, in his counterclaim against Orvis and in his third party complaint, 
claims that a partnership has existed between him and Orvis since years before his SBA 
deposition was taken, and, that based on his partnership interest, he is entitled to 
partnership proceeds from intellectual property, lease payments, and consulting fees paid 
to Orvis by various credit repair businesses, including an entity called the Lexington Law 
Firm. [R. 2624, fflf 2-3.] 
9Judge Hanson's Conclusions of Law included: 
(1) "The principle of judicial estoppel prohibits Johnson from asserting a 
different position in this later action from the position to which he testified under oath in 
the SBA case." [R. 2626,«|1] 
(2) "Judicial estoppel does not require that the parties to the prior and present 
litigation be the same.'5 [Id at ^ 2.] 
(3) "Even if Utah law requires that the parties to the prior and present 
proceedings be the same in order for judicial estoppel to apply, such is not determinative 
in this case because Orvis, having purchased and having been assigned the judgment 
owned by the SBA, is in privity with the SBA." [id, at If 3.] 
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affirming the final Judgment on grounds of judicial estoppel The Court of Appeals 
ruled that Johnson was precluded from asserting a partnership interest in Orvis' 
businesses under the doctrine of judicial estoppel and that summary7 judgment was 
warranted because "Johnson failed to present genuine issues of material fact that a 
partnership existed between him and Orvis." Orvis v. Johnson, 2006 UT App 394, ^  24, 
146 P.3d 886. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This Court should affirm summary judgment in Orvis' favor because Johnson is 
judicially estopped from claiming an essential element of his case — a partnership interest 
in Orvis' businesses -- and therefore no genuine issue of material fact exists for trial and 
judgment as a matter of law is proper. 
The Court of Appeals correctly shifted, under current Utah law, the procedural 
summary judgment burden to Johnson, as the nonmoving party, to show a genuine issue 
of material fact existed for trial after Orvis satisfied his initial burden as the moving 
party. In support of his motion, Orvis submitted Johnson's own sworn deposition 
testimony in the SB A proceeding wherein Johnson unambiguously testified that he did 
not have any interest in any partnership. Based on that and other evidence, Orvis argued 
Johnson was judicially estopped in this case from asserting a partnership interest in 
Orvis' businesses — an essential element of Johnson's case upon which he had the 
burden of proof. Once Orvis met his summary judgment burden, the burden then was 
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correctly shifted to Johnson to show there was a genuine issue of material fact as to 
whether he is judicially estopped from asserting an Orvis-Johnson partnership to avoid 
having summary judgment entered against him. 
In the alternative, if the burden shifting approach applied by the Court of Appeals 
is not the current summary judgment procedure under Utah law, this Court should adopt 
such an approach to summary7 judgment motions under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56. 
This will align Utah law with the United States Supreme Court's interpretation and 
application of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, upon which Utah's rule is based. In 
so doing, Utah's summary judgment procedure will be better positioned to fulfill its 
purpose of promoting judicial efficiency by helping to eliminate baseless claims from the 
crowded calendars of this State's courts before the expenditure of time and money for 
trial. 
Under that proper summary judgment procedural standard, the Court of Appeals 
correctly affirmed the judgment in Orvis' favor and against Johnson based on the record. 
After Orvis challenged Johnson's ability to prove an essential element of his case based 
upon judicial estoppel, Johnson wholly failed to carry his burden of responding with 
competent evidence showing the presence of a genuine dispute of material fact for trial 
on that issue, which is dispositive as to all Johnson's claims. Johnson failed to present 
proof of a genuine dispute as to: (1) whether Johnson's sworn testimony in the SB A 
proceeding that he did not have an interest in any partnership is inconsistent with his 
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claim in this case that he has a partnership interest in Orvis* businesses; (2) whether 
Orvis is the SBA's privy; (3) whether this case involves the same subject matter as the 
SB A post-judgment proceeding; or (4) whether Johnson successfully maintained, in the 
SB A post-judgment collection proceeding, his position that he did not have an interest in 
any partnership. Johnson therefore failed to meet his summary7 judgment burden, and 
judgment as a matter of law was correctly entered in Orvis' favor. 
Finally, Johnson did not argue to the district court that there was a genuine issue 
as to the reliance or bad faith/mistake elements of judicial estoppel. Johnson thereby 
waived any such argument on appeal as to those elements. Likewise, Johnson has 
waived his arguments to this Court that applying judicial estoppel in this case violates 
public policy, and that this Court should order an accounting of the alleged Johnson-
Orvis partnership because those arguments were raised for the first time in Johnson's 
brief to this Court. Accordingly, they should not be considered in this appeal and do not 
provide a legitimate basis for finding error in the Court of Appeals' disposition of the 
case. 
ARGUMENT 
L THE COURT OF APPEALS, UNDER UTAH PROCEDURAL LAW, 
CORRECTLY HELD THAT THE BURDEN SHIFTED TO JOHNSON TO 
PRESENT EVIDENCE ON THE DISPOSITIVE ISSUE OF JUDICIAL 
ESTOPPEL AFTER ORVIS PUT FORTH EVIDENCE ESTABLISHING 
THAT, AS A RESULT OF JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL, JOHNSON COULD 
NOT PROVE A PARTNERSHIP INTEREST-
The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that, under Utah procedural law, the 
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summary judgment burden shifted to Johnson after Orvis made a prima facie showing 
that Johnson could not prove, based upon judicial estoppel, an essential element of his 
case — a partnership with Orvis. Summary judgment is properly granted under the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure where 'there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c); 
Waddoups v. Amalgamated Sugar Co.. 2002 UT 69, ^ 31, 54 P.3d 1054. The rules of 
civil procedure place an initial burden upon the moving party to present evidence — in 
the form of affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions and the like — 
that there are no genuine issues of material fact and judgment in the moving party's favor 
is therefore warranted as a matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c); Waddoups, 2002 UT 69, 
If 31: Jensen v. IHC Hospitals. Inc.. 944 P.2d 327, 339 (Utah 1997). Once the moving 
party satisfies its initial burden, the summary judgment burden is shifted to the 
nonmoving party to present evidence showing the presence of genuine issues of material 
fact for trial. Utah Rule of Civ. P. 56(e); Waddoups. 2002 UT 69, ^ J 31; Grand County v. 
Rogers. 2002 UT 25, ^  21, 44 P.3d 734. 
If the moving party does not bear the ultimate burden of proof, it satisfies its 
initial burden by challenging the nonmoving party's ability to prove an essential element 
of its case on the basis that no genuine issue of material fact exists as to that element. 
See In re Discipline of Sonnenreich. 2004 UT 3, ^ f 41, 86 P.3d 712; Waddoups. 2002 UT 
69, K 31; Gerbich v. Numed. Inc.. 1999 UT 37, ^  12, 977 P.2d 1205; Jensen. 944 P.2d at 
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339; Shaw Res. Ltd.. L.L.C. v. Pruitt. Gushee & BachtelL P.C.. 2006 UT App 313, ^  22, 
142 P.3d 560 (quoting Waddoups, 2002 UT 69, ^ 31); see Massey v. Griffiths, 2007 UT 
10, THJ 12-13, 152 P.3d 312 (moving party without ultimate burden met its summary 
judgment burden by challenging the validity of the plaintiffs' tax deeds); Thayne v. 
Beneficial Life, Inc., 874 P.2d 120, 124 (Utah 1994) (moving party without ultimate 
burden met summary judgment burden by challenging the existence two elements of 
plaintiffs claim). 
The moving party, to satisfy its burden, must present evidence in opposition to 
the motion demonstrating there are admissible facts that can be interpreted to satisfy the 
essential elements of its case, entitling it to proceed to trial. Anderson Dev. Co., L.C. v. 
Tobias, 2005 UT 36, ^ 23, 116 P.3d 323; In re Discipline of Sonnenreich, 2004 UT 3, 1j 
41; Gerbich, 1999 UT 37, % 12; Jensen, 944 P.2d at 338; Thavne, 874 P,2d at 124; Shaw, 
2006 UT App 313, ^  22; Derby, 2001 UT App, % 18; Bums v. Cannondale Bicycle Co., 
876 P.2d 415, 419 (Utah Ct App 1994). If the nonmoving party fails to do so, the 
moving party is entitled to judgment in its favor as a matter of law. Tobias, 2005 UT 36, 
Tf 23; see Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e) (if the nonmoving party fails to "set forth specific facts 
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial [then] summary judgment, if appropriate, 
shall be entered against him."). 
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This burden-shifting approach to summary judgment motions is a matter of 
existing Utah law, contrary to Judge Bench's concurring opinion in this case and his 
dissent in Shaw. Orvis v. Johnson. 2006 UT App., ffif 25-27, 146 P.3d 886 (Bench, P J., 
concurring); Shaw. 2006 UT App 313, fflf 61-68 (Bench, P.J., dissenting). This burden-
shifting framework is clearly stated in the procedures this Court adopted in Rule 56 and 
is illustrated by this Court's decisions. 
The Utah Constitution specifically empowers this Court to adopt the procedural 
rules governing the method by which civil disputes are adjudicated. Utah Const. Art. 
VIII, § 4; see Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-4(1) (West 2004). This Court, pursuant to its 
constitutional rule-making authority, adopted the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and has 
made changes to those rules where appropriate.10 Every new procedural rule or rule 
change, prior to adoption by this Court, has been subjected to extensive deliberation and 
consideration by the Court's Advisory Committee on the Rules of Civil Procedure; by the 
public, the bench, and the bar during a comment period; and by this Court before final 
adoption.11 
l0This Court's change to procedural rules, pursuant to its rule-making authority, is 
significantly different from the Court's change to substantive common law rules by a 
subsequent decision. A change to substantive common law rules only occurs under "a 
very exacting standard" once a "'substantial burden5" has been met Shaw, 2006 UT 
App 313, ^  65 (Bench, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
11
 The public can require further deliberation through their elected representatives 
in the Legislature and the Legislature's ability to seek a rule's change. Utah Const. Art. 
VIII, § 4; Utah Code Ann. 78-2-4(1) (West 2004). 
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This Court adopted Rule 56 - the rule governing the procedure for summary 
judgment motions - through this deliberative rule-making process. The procedure 
established in Rule 56 is the burden-shifting approach used by the Court of Appeals in 
this case. Rule 56(c) requires a party moving for summary judgment to present evidence 
in the form of pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
affidavits, and the like showing "that there is no genuine issue of material fact for trial 
and that [they] are entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). Once 
a moving party has properly supported her motion as required by Rule 56(c), Rule 56(e) 
shifts the burden to the nonmoving party7 and requires him to respond with evidence 
"setfting] forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." If the 
nonmoving party fails to meet his burden, summary judgment "shall be entered" in the 
moving party's favor. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e). 
Rule 56fs burden-shifting approach to summary judgment motions is clearly 
illustrated by this Court's decision in Waddoups. 2002 UT 69. There, this Court 
affirmed summary judgment in favor of the moving defendant on the ground that 
plaintiffs had failed to meet their burden as the nonmoving party. kL at fflf 34, 36. This 
Court applied the Rule that under Utah law "once the moving party challenges an 
element of the nonmoving party's case on the basis that no genuine issue of material fact 
exists for trial, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to present evidence that is 
sufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact." Id. at f^ 31. 
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In Waddoups, defendant, as the moving party, met its initial burden by pointing 
out that plaintiffs did not have proof sufficient to meet an essential element of their 
intentional interference and conspiracy claims.12 Id at % 33. As a result, the summary 
judgment burden shifted to the plaintiffs to demonstrate the presence of a genuine issue 
of material fact for trial to avoid having summary judgment entered against them. IcL at 
Tflf 33-34, 35-36. Because plaintiffs did not present competent evidence to demonstrate 
there was a genuine issue of material fact, this Court properly affirmed summary 
judgment in defendant's favor. Id at f^ 34, 36. 
Here, the Court of Appeals held that Orvis properly supported his motion with 
admissible evidence of Johnson's own sworn testimony and judicial records from the 
SBA case. Orvis thus satisfied his initial burden when he challenged the fundamental 
essential element of Johnson's case. Under the plain requirements of Rule 56(e), as the 
Court of Appeals correctly ruled, the burden then shifted to Johnson to present evidence 
in opposition to the motion that could be interpreted to satisfy the essential element of his 
case, such that there was a genuine issue for trial. 
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals correctly construed and applied the procedural 
burdens borne by opposing parties to a summary judgment motion under Utah law, and 
12The opinion does not make clear what the defendants argued relative to plaintiffs 
conspiracy claim. See Waddoups. 2002 UT 69, fflf 35-36. However, as the defendants' 
brief in that case makes clear, their sole position to this Court was that summary judgment 
was appropriate because "plaintiffs provide no evidence to support their claim " Br. 
of Appellee 48 (Case No. 20000776-SC) (on file with the Utah State Law Library). 
20 
this Court should therefore affirm summar}'judgment in Orvis' favor. 
II. IN THE ALTERNATIVE, IF THE BURDEN-SHIFTING APPROACH 
APPLIED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS IS NOT UTAH LAW, THIS 
COURT SHOULD NOW ADOPT SUCH AN APPROACH TO DECIDING 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTIONS IN UTAH. 
If the Court determines the burden shifting approach applied by the Court of 
Appeals is not Utah law - contrary to the language of Rule 56 and the applicable case 
law - the Court should nonetheless adopt that approach to summary judgment motions in 
Utah, thereby aligning Utah law with the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, upon which Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56 is 
based. In so doing, this Court will better position Utah's summary judgment procedure 
to fulfill its purpose of promoting judicial efficiency by eliminating baseless claims from 
the calendars of Utah's district courts before the expenditure of the time and cost for 
needless trials. After adopting such an approach as Utah law, this Court should affirm, 
as correct, the application of that approach in this case.13 
The Utah Constitution and the Utah Code grant this Court with authority to "adopt 
rules of procedure" to be used in the courts of the state and charge this Court with 
13Celotex's burden shifting approach to summary judgment is the growing trend in 
this country. Thirty-five states have either adopted Celotex or cited Celotex with 
approval. See Thomas W. Logue and Javier Alberto Soto, Florida Should Adopt the 
Celotex Standard For Summary Judgments, Fla. B.J., Feb. 2002 at 20, App. 1 (collecting 
cases of the thirty-five states that have either adopted or cited Celotex with approval). As 
the Supreme Court of Massachusetts stated in adopting Celotex: "it makes eminent good 
sense to do so." Kourouvacilis v. General Motors Corp.. 575 N.E.2d 734, 738 (Mass 
1991). 
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•'governing the practice of law/' Utah Const. Art. VIII, § 4; Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-4(1) 
& (3) (West 2004). The rules of procedure governing the practice of law in civil cases in 
this State have been designed by this Court to "secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive 
determination of every action." Utah R. Civ. P. 1(a). As an integral part of the rules of 
civil procedure, summary judgment should be interpreted and applied by courts in a 
manner that most effectively promotes the rules* ultimate design. 
This is especially true in this era of mere notice pleading, see Utah R. Civ. P. 8(a), 
wherein summary judgment provides the only effective mechanism for a court to pierce 
the pleadings of a case, test its merits, and eliminate baseless claims before the court and ' 
parties needlessly spend the time and resources for trial. See Amjacs Interwest Inc. v. 
Design Assocs., 635 P.2d 53, 54 (Utah 1981) (noting purpose of summary judgment is to 
eliminate time and expense of trial on baseless claims); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett 477 
U.S. 317, 324 (1986) ("[W]ith the advent of 'notice pleading/ the motion to dismiss 
seldom fulfills this function any more, and its place has been taken by the motion for 
summary judgment." ); Martin B. Louis, A Federal Summary Judgment Doctrine: A 
Critical Analysis, 83 Yale L. J. 746 (1974) (observing that, due to notice pleading, { 
complaints will often survive motions to dismiss and, thus, iCthe motion for summary 
judgment has become the first real opportunity for identifying factually deficient claims 
or defenses"). 
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A burden-shifting approach which this Court applied in Waddoups, 2002 UT 69, ^ 
31, the Court of Appeals applied in this case, Orvis v. Johnson. 2006 UT App. 394, «ft 16, 
146 P.3d 886, and the United States Supreme Court, under the federal rule, applied in 
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986), allows summary judgment procedure 
to be used most effectively.14 
This approach aligns the burdens borne by opposing parties to a summary 
judgment motion with the ultimate burden they bear at trial. A moving party that does 
not bear the ultimate burden of proof on a claim or issue can discharge its initial burden 
by challenging, in the manner provided for in Rule 56(c), an essential element of the 
nonmoving party's case on the basis that no genuine issue of material fact exists as to 
that element for trial, without having to affirmatively negate the entirety of the 
nonmoving party's case. See Waddoups, 2002 UT 69, f^ 31; Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 
325. Summary judgment is appropriate in this circumstance because c;a complete failure 
of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily 
renders all other facts immaterial." Schafir v. Harrigan. 879 P.2d 1384, 1391 (Utah Ct. 
14Because Utah Rule 56 and Federal Rule 56 are substantially similar, see Utah R. 
Civ P. 56, Compiler's Notes, the United States Supreme Court's interpretation and 
application of the federal rule is persuasive as to the proper interpretation and application 
of Utah's rule. Tucker v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.. 2002 UT 54, ^  7 n.2, 53 P.3d 
947 ("Interpretations of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are persuasive where the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are 'substantially similar' to the federal rules."); 438 Main 
Street v. Easy Heat Inc.. 2004 UT 72, lj 64, 99 P.3d 801 (u[S]ince the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure were fashioned after the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, we may look to 
decisions under the federal rules for guidance.") 
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App. 1994) (quoting Celotex. 477 U.S. at 323) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Once the moving party makes this initial showing, the burden is then shifted to the 
nonmoving party7 to present the court with competent evidence showing the presence of a 
genuine dispute of material fact as to that challenged element, making a trial to resolve 
that dispute necessary. See Waddoups. 2002 UT 69, If 31; Celotex. 477 U.S. at 322-23. 
As the United States Supreme Court has observed: 
Rule 56 must be construed with due regard not only for the rights of 
persons asserting claims and defenses that are adequately based in fact to 
have those claims and defenses tried to a jury, but also for the rights of 
persons opposing such claims and defenses to demonstrate in the manner 
provided by the Rule, prior to trial, that the claims and defenses have no 
factual basis. 
Celotex. 477 U.S. at 327. A burden-shifting approach to summary judgment, which 
aligns the summary7 judgment burden with the ultimate burden borne by the parties at 
trial, best serves this principle and promotes judicial efficiency: 
If the party moving for summary judgment must discharge a rigorous 
burden regardless of whether he would bear the burden of proof of trial, he 
could almost never compel the pleader to demonstrate that he can prove the 
essential elements [of his case]. As a result the movant could rarely 
intercept a factually deficient claim or defense. 
Louis, supra p.22, at 752. 
Placing a less rigorous burden on moving parties who do not bear the burden of 
proof at trial, by allowing them to meet their initial burden by challenging the nonmoving 
party's ability to prove an essential element of his or her case, allows the summary 
judgment procedure to better serve its purpose of "isolating] and disposing] of factually 
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unsupported claims or defenses." Id at 323-24 (noting that summary judgment rule 
should be interpreted in a way that allows it to accomplish its principal purpose of 
isolating and disposing of factually unsupported claims and adopting burden shifting 
approach). As this Court has repeatedly recognized, the very purpose of summary 
judgment is to avoid unnecessary trials and the accompanying burden and expense on the 
parties and the courts. Reagan Outdoor Advertising. Inc. v. Lundgren. 692 P.2d 776, 779 
(Utah 1984) (noting purpose of summary judgment rule is to avoid unnecessary trial); 
Amjacs Interwest. Inc. v. Design Assocs., 635 P.2d 53, 54 (Utah 1981) (noting that 
purpose of summary judgment is to "eliminate the time, trouble and expense" of trial); 
Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. Cunningham. 353 P.2d 168, 170 (Utah 1960) (same); 
see Charles E. Clark, The Summary Judgment 36 Minnesota L. Rev. 567, 579 (1952) 
(stating, as one of the principal draftsmen of Federal Rule 56, that "summary judgment is 
an important and necessary part of the series of devices designed for the swift uncovering 
of the merits and either their effective immediate disposition or their advancement" to 
trial). 
If a nonmoving party is challenged on an essential element of its case, and is 
unable to respond by presenting the court with competent evidence showing a genuine 
issue of material fact worthy of trial, proceeding to trial would only waste the trial court 
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and jurors • time and add to the cost and burdens of civil litigation.15 There is simply no 
question that resources are wasted by permitting a case to be tried when a party7 has no 
evidence to establish a necessary7 element and the exact same outcome (failure on the 
claim) could be obtained through summary7 judgment. 
For example, if this Court would have reversed summary7 judgment in the 
defendant's favor in Waddoups because defendant did not affirmatively disprove the 
plaintiffs' case, the case would have proceeded to trial, even though plaintiffs had no 
evidence to establish essential elements of intentional interference and conspiracy and 
the eventual outcome for plaintiff would have been exactly the same. 2002 UT 69, ffif 
34, 36. Likewise, if the D.C. Circuit's decision reversing summary judgment in Celotex 
would have been adopted by the Supreme Court, the parties in that case would have been 
forced to trial because the defendant was unable to disprove the causation element of the 
plaintiffs case, even though the plaintiff had no evidence to create a genuine issue for 
trial on that element and the plaintiffs case therefore would necessarily have failed. 477 
U.S. at 320. In both cases, application of a burden-shifting approach to summary 
judgment allowed the summary judgment procedure to fulfill its principal purpose of 
promoting judicial efficiency and justice, see Continental Bank & Trust 353 P.2d at 332 
< 
15The burden on jurors - disinterested members of the public — is particularly 
acute because they will be required to spend their time participating in voir dire and to 
hear a plaintiffs entire case in chief, only to have a directed verdict entered due to the 
plaintiffs failure to provide evidence supporting an essential element of his or her case. 
See Utah R. Civ. P. 50(a). ( 
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(noting truism that "'justice delayed is justice denied"), by avoiding the time, resources 
and expense inherent in civil litigation by timely eliminating baseless claims. 
Although the Court has not expressly adopted Celotex as a matter of Utah law, see 
Harline v. Barker. 912 P.2d 433, 445 n.13 (Utah 1996), both this Court and the Court of 
Appeals have recognized the utility of this burden-shifting approach and have both 
applied this approach16 and cited Celotex with approval17 The Court should not retreat 
from this precedent. 
The restrictive approach to summary judgment that Johnson appears to advocate, 
based on Judge Bench's dissent in Shaw, 2006 UT App 313, ffij 61-68, would prevent the 
summary judgment procedure from fulfilling its very purpose. Under that approach, a 
moving party who does not bear the ultimate burden of proof at trial and is unable to 
affirmatively disprove the nonmoving party's case in its entirety would nonetheless be 
forced to trial — even where the nonmoving party has no evidence showing a genuine 
dispute on an issue dispositive of his claim. That approach would have allowed the 
mertiless claims in both Waddoups and Celotex to proceed to a full trial. 
Adoption of Judge Bench's approach is unwise because it would virtually grind to 
a halt the ability of Utah's district courts to resolve other meritorious and important 
16Waddoups, 2002 UT 69, % 31; Grand County; 2002 UT 25, % 21; Shaw, 2006 UT 
App 313, % 22; Andalex Res., Inc. v. Mvers, 871 P.2d 1041, 1046-47. 
17Tobias, 2005 UT 36, f 23; Jensen, 944 P.2d at 338; Andalex Res., Inc. v. Mvers. 
871 P.2d 1041, 1046-47; Burns v. Cannondale Bicycle Co., 876 P.2d 415, 419 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1994); Schafirv.Harrigan, 879 P.2d 1384, 1391 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
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disputes. The district courts of this state have a staggering and building backlog. For 
example, in fiscal year 2006, 32,497 civil cases, aside from criminal and family law 
matters, were filed in the Third Judicial District Court alone. Utah Courts Caseload 
Statistics FY2006, District 3 (available at www.utcourts.gov/stats/). The Legislative 
Auditor General has ftirther concluded, based on clearance rates in the district court, that 
the civil backlog is building. Report to the Legislature, Number 2005-05, A Performance 
Audit of the Timeliness of Civil Cases in District Court. 26-29 (April 2005). Under 
these circumstances, the district courts are in need of greater flexibility in dealing with 
and resolving cases, especially with cases when a party has no evidence to prove a fact 
essential to her claims. 
Not only would a restrictive approach place a greater burden upon the courts, it 
also exacerbates an already heavy burden and expense that litigants must bear. As one 
commentator has explained: 
Refusal of summary disposal of the case may be a real hardship on the 
more deserving of the litigants; since appeal does not lie from refusal, as it 
does from the grant, the penalties may be the severer. A court has failed in 
granting justice when it forces a party to an expensive trial of several 
weeks' [sic] duration to meet purely formal allegations without substance 
fully as much as when it improperly refuses to hear a case at all 
Clark, supra p. 25 at 578. Likewise, as former United States Supreme Court Justices 
Stewart, Powell, and Rehnquist have stated: 
Delay and excessive expense now characterize a large percentage of all 
civil litigation The mere threat of delay or unbearable expense denies 
justice to many actual or prospective litigants. Persons or businesses of 
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comparatively limited means settle unjust claims and relinquish just claims 
simply because they cannot afford to litigate. Litigation costs have become 
intolerable, and they cast a lengthening shadow over the basic fairness of 
our legal system. 
85 FRD 521, 523 (1980) (dissenting statement to 1980 Amendments to the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure). Forcing litigants who are faced with claims that will ultimately fail, 
but for which they are unable to affirmatively disprove ever}7 element, to endure the 
tremendous expense of a full trial, unjustifiably clogs the courts, prevents timely 
resolution of legitimate disputes, and otherwise forces capitulation to meritless claims. 
In sum, if this Court does not agree that Court Appeals followed Utah law in 
applying a burden-shifting approach to summary'judgment, this Court should nonetheless 
adopt that approach to govern summary judgment practice in Utah. In so doing, Utah's 
summary7 judgment rule will more effectively fulfill its principal purpose of promoting 
judicial efficiency by eliminating baseless claims and defenses prior to the time and 
expense of trial. Further, because the Court of Appeals correctly applied such an a 
approach in this case, this Court should affirm summary judgment in Orvis' favor. 
IIL SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN ORVIS' FAVOR SHOULD BE AFFIRMED 
BECAUSE THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY APPLIED THE 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD IN FINDING THAT JOHNSON 
FAILED TO PRESENT EVIDENCE CREATING A GENUINE ISSUE OF 
FACT FOR TRIAL, 
The Court of Appeals correctly applied the summary judgment standard by 
affirming summary judgment in Orvis5 favor where it is undisputed that Johnson is 
judicially estopped from asserting a partnership interest in Orvis' businesses ~ the 
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fundamental essential element of Johnson's case -- entitling Orvis to judgment as a 
matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c); Grand Counts 2002 UT 25, ^ j 21. 
As discussed in Part L the Court of Appeals correctly construed and applied the 
procedural summary judgment burdens. In his summary judgment motion, Orvis 
challenged the fundamental element of Johnson's case by putting forth evidence that 
Johnson in the SB A proceeding had denied, under oath, that he had any interest in any 
partnership. That evidence proved that Johnson was judicially estopped from taking the 
opposite position in this case. 
The policy behind the judicial estoppel doctrine is clear: 
The doctrine is said to have found its foundation in the obligation under 
which every man is placed to speak and act according to the truth of the 
case; and in the policy of the law to suppress the mischiefs from the 
destruction of all confidence in the dealings of men, if they were allowed to 
deny that which by their solemn and deliberate acts they declared to be 
true. And this doctrine applies with peculiar force to admissions or 
statements made under the sanction of an oath, in the courts of judicial 
proceedings. The chief security and safeguard for the purity and efficiency 
of the administration of justice is to be found in the proper reverence for 
the sanctity of an oath. 
Hamilton v. Zimmerman. 37 Tenn. (5 Sneed) 39, 1857 WL 2547, * 4 (1857). As this 
Court has reiterated, the purpose of the doctrine is "to uphold the sanctity of oaths, 
thereby safeguarding the integrity of the judicial process from conduct such as knowing 
misrepresentations or fraud on the court." Salt Lake City v. Silver Fork Pipeline Corp.. 
913 P.2d 731, 734 (Utah 1995). Accordingly, Johnson's testimony in the SBA 
proceeding, contrasted with his new position in this case, established Johnson lied — 
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either under oath, in SBA proceeding or before the court below. Judicial estoppel exists 
to ~raise[] the cost of [such] lying." Chaveriat v. Williams Pipe Line Co., 11 F.3d 1420, 
1428 (7th Cir. 1993). The cost to Johnson was that he must be held to his testimony 
before the SBA, through an adverse judgment in this case on his claim of a partnership 
with Orvis. 
Johnson's response to the summary judgment motion failed to demonstrate 
evidence creating a dispute for trial on whether judicial estoppel should apply. Johnson 
opposed Orvis' motion on two basic grounds: (1) his sworn testimony in the SBA 
proceeding - that he did not have any interest in any partnership - was not inconsistent 
with his position in this case that he has a partnership interest in Orvis9 businesses or, 
alternatively, there is a dispute of material fact as to whether his sworn testimony is 
inconsistent with his position in this case; and (2) three of judicial estoppel's elements — 
the prior judicial proceeding involved the same parties or their privies, this case and the 
prior judicial proceeding involve the same subject matter, and the prior position was 
successfully maintained in the prior judicial proceeding ~ were not met in this case. [R. 
2257-64.] Johnson did not dispute that any other elements of judicial estoppel, besides 
those three, had been satisfied. [See R. 2242-65.] The only evidence Johnson filed in 
support of his opposition was his Affidavit and a Corrections Supplementing Affidavit of 
Jamis Johnson. [R. 2266-2515, Addendum Exh. 4; 2608-18, Addendum Exh. 5.] 
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Johnson's arguments in opposition to Orvis' motion and the evidence he put forth 
in support of those arguments are wholly insufficient to meet his burden of showing a 
genuine issue of material fact worthy of trial as to whether he is judicially estopped in 
this case from asserting a partnership interest in Orvis' businesses. 
A. There Is No Genuine Dispute As To Whether Johnson's Sworn 
Testimony Denying Any Interest In Any Partnership Is Inconsistent 
With His Position In This Case That He is A Partner With Orvis In 
Orvis' Businesses, 
The Court of Appeals correctly held, viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to Johnson, that Johnson failed to show a genuine dispute for trial as to 
whether his sworn testimony in the SBA proceeding — that he did not have any interest in 
any partnership — was inconsistent with his position in this case that he has a partnership 
< 
interest in Orvis' businesses. During his deposition in the SBA proceeding, Johnson was 
asked a series of questions to identify any assets of Johnson's on which the government 
may execute to collect its judgment. [R. 2395-2482, Addendum Exh. 2.] As part of that < 
line of questioning, Johnson was asked about his savings and checking accounts, 
certificate of deposits, mutual funds, retirement accounts, and life insurance policies. [R. 
i 
2421-24.] The very next question was: "Do you have any interest in any partnerships?" 
[R. 2424:16-17.] Johnson's answer to this question was: 
i 
No. I mean, you know, often Fll have a joint endeavor with somebody, but 
I don't have a partnership or set up a partnership or an LLC. You know, if 
I get a deal I say, [h]ey, do you want to do this deal together? We'll go up 
to summit county and buy a lot. 
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[R. 2424:18-23.] When the SBA followed up with the statement: "[s]o a joint venture/* 
[R. 2424:24] Johnson responded: "Yeah, you can call it that, but I don't have any 
outgoing [sic] partnerships." [R. 2424:25, R. 2425:1.] 
Based upon this sworn testimony, it is undisputed that Johnson unequivocally 
represented under oath that he did not have any interest in any partnerships. Johnson 
argues, nevertheless, that there is a genuine issue as to whether his sworn statement is 
inconsistent with his position in this case on the basis that his statement before the SBA 
"was intended to refer only to real estate ventures." [Pet'r Br. 22.18] Johnson did not 
present any evidence to support his bald assertion. In fact, the only evidence relative to 
this issue is the plain language of Johnson's statement in the SBA proceeding and 
Johnson's affidavit testimony that he "accurately disclosed the information requested by 
the SBA" in his deposition, including his interests in any partnerships. [See R. 2424-25; 
2274-75, TJ 39, Addendum Exh. 4.] There is nothing in Johnson's affidavit that 
supported his assertion that he believed the SBA's question only referred to real estate 
partnerships or that his answer only addressed real estate partnerships. [See generally R. 
2266-83.] 
To the contrary, the evidence in this case does show that in twenty-seven pages of 
questions preceding the partnership question, not one single question concerns property 
18
 Johnson incorrectly refers to his brief as Brief of Appellant. Orvis' cites to 
Johnson's brief as Brief of Petitioner. 
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ventures or partnerships in which Johnson may have been involved. [See R. 2397-2424, 
Addendum Exh. I.]19 In fact, the only questions about real estate concerned the address 
of his primary residence [R. 2398:2] and to whom he paid rent for his business office. 
[R. at 2401:21-25, 2402:1-2.] All the other questions prior to the partnership question 
concern income taxes, Johnson's employment, Johnson's sources of income, and 
Johnson's interest in and income from D.M. Johnson & Associates, LLC. [See R. 
2395-2482.] Johnson's unsupported, bald assertion cannot create a genuine issue of fact, 
and, even when viewing facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, a court 
may not assume facts for which no evidence is offered. Dairy Products Servs. Inc. v. 
CitvofWellsville. 2000 UT 81, H 24, 13 P.3d 581; Peterson v. Coca-Cola USA. 2002 UT 
42, Tf 20, 48 P.3d 941. The Court of Appeals therefore correctly held that Johnson failed 
to meet his burden of showing a genuine dispute as to whether his SB A sworn testimony 
statement and his position in this case are inconsistent and correctly granted summary7 
i 
judgment in Orvis' favor. 
B. Johnson Failed To Show A Genuine Issue As To Whether Orvis Is The 
Privy Of The SB A. 
i 
The Court of Appeals correctly held that Johnson failed to create a genuine issue 
of material fact for trial as to whether Orvis is the privy of the SB A because the 
i 
19Although the questioning did not involve property interests, Johnson did mention 
having "flipped" real estate in Park City in answering a question about whether all the 
income he generated came from legal work. [R at 2415:8-11.] 
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undisputed evidence shows that Orvis purchased and was assigned the SBA's judgment 
against Johnson. Invocation of judicial estoppel requires that the prior and subsequent 
judicial proceedings involve the same parties or their privies. Tracy Loan & Trust Co. v. 
Openshaw Investment Co., 132 P.2d 388, 390. Under Utah law, i;as applied to 
judgments or decrees of the court, privity means one whose interest has been legally 
represented at the time." Searle Brothers v. Searle, 588 P.2d 689, 691 (Utah 1978). It is 
undisputed in this case that Orvis purchased, was assigned, and owns the SB A judgment. 
[R. 2513, Addendum Exh. 3.] Johnson admitted as much in the affidavit he submitted in 
support of his opposition to Orvis' summary judgment motion. [R. 2281, J^ 60, 
Addendum Exh. 4.] Orvis is, therefore, the SBA's privy. As the SBA's privy, judicial 
estoppel is properly invoked to bar Johnson from taking a position in this action contrary 
his sworn testimony in the SB A proceedings in which the SBA was a party7. 
Johnson does not identify any genuine issues of material fact for trial as to 
whether Orvis is the SBA's privy. Johnson's only argument to this Court is that the 
judgment was purchased with misappropriated partnership funds and in violations of 
fiduciary7 duties. [Pet'r Br. 35-39.] But, as the Court of Appeals correctly held, Johnson 
has failed to present any proof of his conclusory contention.20 Such unsupported 
20Johnson does not present any evidence of misappropriation by Orvis. Johnson's 
citation to and reliance on the deposition of Tommy Triplett [R. 855-57] and Jade Griffin 
[R. 877-84] is completely irrelevant. In fact, in September 2002, Judge Hanson struck 
those depositions from the record and prohibited any reference to them because of 
"irregularities in how the depositions were conducted." [R. 1439-42.] Additionally, Will 
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allegations cannot create a genuine issue sufficient to avoid summary judgment. See 
Pain7 Products. 2000 UT 81, f 54. Indeed, the only evidence relevant to this issue is the 
document assigning the SBA judgment which, even viewed in the light most favorable to 
Johnson, undisputedly assigns the SBA judgment to Orvis. [R. 2513, Addendum Exh. 
2.] 
Consequently, Johnson failed to meet his burden and summary7 judgment was 
correctly entered against him. 
C. There Is No Genuine Issue As To Whether This Case Involves The 
Same Subject Matter As The Post-Judgment SBA Proceeding. 
Because Johnson failed to present proof of a genuine issue for trial as to whether 
this case and the supplemental proceedings conducted by the SBA involved the same 
subject matter, the Court of Appeals correctly upheld summary7 judgment in Orvis' favor. 
It is undisputed that the purpose of the SBA supplemental proceeding was to 
identify Johnson's assets, including any interest he may have in any partnerships, upon 
which the SBA could execute to satisfy its judgment against Johnson. This is the precise 
reason Johnson's deposition was taken and that is why the questions at his deposition 
were directed at identifying assets in which he might have an interest. Indeed, Judge 
Hanson characterized those proceedings as being "for collection purposes." [R. 2627, f 
5, Addendum Exh. 7.] The subject matter of this action is likewise undisputed; this is an 
VigiFs deposition [R. 2585-88] simply does not provide any evidentiary support for 
Johnson's contention. 
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action to determine whether Johnson has, as one of his assets, a partnership interest in 
Orvis' businesses. [R. 1-14, 20-39, 2624; Pet'r Br. viii.j 
There is simply no genuine dispute, therefore, as to the fact that both the SBA 
proceeding and this case involve the exact same subject matter of an alleged partnership 
between Orvis and Johnson. As a result, judicial estoppel should be applied to prevent 
Johnson from denying, truthfully, the existence of a partnership in the prior proceeding 
and then asserting the existence of a partnership to the court in this action. 
Although the subject matters of the two proceedings are the same, Johnson 
constructs an argument asserting the actions do not involve the same subject matters by 
claiming that the SBA action concerned only issues of contract and foreclosure and not 
the alleged Johnson-Orvis partnership because only those issues of contract and 
foreclosure were "actually litigated." [See Pet'r Br. 39-40.] That argument misses the 
point. 
First, the relevant prior judicial proceeding is the SBA post-judgment proceeding, 
in which Johnson testified under oath that he did not have any interest in any partnership; 
the relevant proceeding is not the pre-judgment SBA action where contract and 
foreclosure issues where resolved. It is undisputed that the post-judgment proceeding 
involved the subject of Johnson's interest in any partnerships. 
Second, the application of judicial estoppel is not limited to issues "actually 
litigated." In fact, the statement that estoppel only applies to "issues actually litigated" in 
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Masters v. Worslev. 777 P.2d 499 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), upon which Johnson bases his 
argument is irrelevant because it was not made in the context of judicial estoppel. See 
id at 504. Although Masters speaks in terms of judicial estoppel, Masters actually 
involved the distinct doctrine of collateral estoppel The Masters court's holding was 
based upon this Court's statement in Richards v. Hodson, 485 P.2d 1044 (1971) that 
collateral estoppel — not judicial estoppel — ''applies only to issues actually litigated and 
not those that could have been determined." Id, at 1046 (applying collateral estoppel to 
issue actually litigated). Johnson cites no authority in which judicial estoppel is not 
applied to a prior statement — as opposed to a prior adjudication ~ because that statement 
was not "actually litigated." Johnson has confused the doctrine of collateral estoppel, 
which requires actual litigation, with the doctrine of judicial estoppel, which does not 
and his argument regarding "issues actually litigated," therefore, misses the mark. 
See Richards, 485 P.2d at 1046 (noting collateral estoppel requires issues to have been 
actually litigated); Tracy Loan, 132 P.2d at 390 (listing judicial estoppel elements and 
not including actually litigated); In re Adoption of S.A.J., 838 A.2d 616, 636 n.4 (Pa. 
2003) (noting confusion between collateral estoppel, requiring actually litigated, with 
judicial estoppel which does not). 
Johnson provides no competent evidence to show a genuine issue of material fact 
as to whether the SBA post-judgment proceeding and this case involve the same subject 
matter of whether Johnson has a partnership interest in Orvis' businesses. Summary 
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judgment in Orvis' favor therefore was correctly granted and affirmed by the Court of 
Appeals. 
D. Johnson Has Failed To Present Proof Creating A Genuine Issue For 
Trial On The "Successfully Maintained" Element of Judicial Estoppel 
Because It Is Undisputed That The SBA Did Not Collect Its Judgment 
From Johnson. 
The Court of Appeals was correct in holding that Johnson failed to present a 
genuine issue of material fact as to whether he successfully maintained his position in the 
SBA proceeding that he did not have any interest in any partnerships. Although judicial 
estoppel requires the position asserted in the prior proceeding to have been "successfully 
maintained/' Tracy Loan, 132 P.2d at 390, it is undeniable in this case that, as a result, of 
Johnson's sworn testimony that he had no assets — including any partnership interests — 
the SBA was unable to collect on its judgment and. consequently, sold the judgment to 
Orvis at an extreme discount.21 [R. 2271, ^ 25; 2280, ^ 52; 2282, % 60; 2381, 2513, 
Addendum Exh. 3; 2627, ^[ 4-7, Addendum Exh. 8.] Johnson presents no contrary 
^Johnson's statement that it is "false" to assume that the SBA did not collect on its 
judgment has no actual basis in the record and the citation he provides does not support 
that statement. [See Pet'r Br. 40, 41 & n.10.] First, selling a judgment does not equate to 
collecting it. Indeed, to date, even with the judgment in Orvis' hands, Orvis has not been 
able to collect it. Second, Johnson cites merely to the affidavit that Johnson submitted to 
oppose Orvis5 summary judgment motion, where Johnson states that the SBA judgment 
was purchased "at precisely the discount that Johnson was discussing with the SBA." 
[See id.; R. 2282, ^ 58.] That statement simply has no bearing on whether he successfully 
maintained his sworn position of not having any interest in any partnership and certainly 
does not establish that the SBA collected its full judgment from Johnson. Moreover, the 
SBA judgment was sold at a significant discount. 
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evidence. There is no doubt, therefore, that Johnson successfully maintained and 
prevailed upon his position in the prior SBA proceeding that he owned no partnership 
interest. 
Further, Johnson's argument that there is a genuine dispute of fact as to whether 
the statement was "successfully maintained" because the statement was not "actually 
litigated'* is without merit. [Pet*r Br. 41-42.] Once again Johnson bases this argument 
on Masters v. Worsley, 777 P.2d 499, and once again his argument is unpersuasive. As 
discussed above in Part II. C, the application of judicial estoppel does not require the 
statement to have been actually litigated; Masters' statement that estoppel only applies to 
issues actually litigated was made in the separate context of collateral estoppel and is, 
therefore, irrelevant. See id. [See supra p. 37-38.] Johnson cites no other authority to 
support his contention that the successfully maintained element of judicial estoppel is 
limited to statements actually litigated. In fact, the element is not so limited under Utah 
law. See, e.g.. Occidental/Nebraska Fed. Sav. Bank v. Mehr. 791 P.2d 217, 220 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1990) (applying judicial estoppel to prevent Occidental from taking position in 
subsequent judicial proceeding that a trustee's sale was invalid due to a procedural error 
when it previously asserted an inconsistent position in a non-judicial proceeding). 
In the absence of a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Johnson 
successfully maintained his position of owning no partnership interest in the SBA 
proceeding, the Court of Appeals correctly upheld summary judgment in Orvis' favor. 
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E. Johnson Did Not Argue, And Failed To Preserve As An Issue For 
Appeal, Whether Additional Elements of "Reliance" And "Bad 
Faith/Mistake" Are Required To Apply Judicial Estoppel. 
Because Johnson presented the district court with no argument that reliance and 
bad faith/mistake were required elements of judicial estoppel or that genuine issues of 
material fact existed regarding them, there is no question that the Court of Appeals 
correctly held Johnson failed to preserve and, therefore, waived any argument as to these 
elements for appellate review. Under Utah law, to assert an issue as a basis for reversal 
on appeal that issue must have been preserved in the lower court in "such a way that the 
trial court ha[d] the opportunity to rule on that issue." Brookside Mobile Home Park v. 
Peebles. 2002 UT 48,1J14, 48 P.3d 968. "This rule exists to give the trial court an 
opportunity to address the claimed error, and if appropriate correct it" and to "prevent[] a 
party' from avoiding the issue at trial for strategic reasons only to raise the issue on 
appeal if the strategy fails." Tschaggeny v. Milbank Ins. Co.. 2007 UT 37, ^ 20, 
P.3d (quoting State v. Cram. 2002 UT 74, % 10, 10 P.3d 346). 
Johnson's papers in opposition to Orvis' summary judgment motion challenged 
only the judicial estoppel elements of privity, same subject matter, and "successfully 
maintained." [R. 2242-2515, 2608-18.] Johnson did not argue there were genuine 
disputes for trial as to any other element of judicial estoppel or that reliance and bad 
faith/mistake were additional elements that must be established. [See id.] As a result, 
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under settled Utah law, Johnson failed to preserve any argument on these elements as 
grounds for review. See Brookside. 2002 UT 48, f^ 14. 
Johnson's argument to this Court provides no other reasonable conclusion. 
Johnson provides no legitimate proof that he argued the reliance and bad faith/mistake 
elements below in a manner in which Judge Hanson could have considered and ruled 
upon them. [See PetT Br. 30-35, 42-44.] Johnson's contention that the issue of reliance 
was preserved merely because at oral argument his counsel suggested to the court that 
there had been no reliance by Orvis on the sworn statement is without merit; [See id. at 
32] Johnson did not argue that the SBA did not rely upon his statement. To the contrary, 
the record established as an undisputed fact that the SBA (Orvis' privy) did rely on the 
sworn statement because it did not execute upon Johnson's alleged partnership interest. 
Johnson's papers on the summary judgment motion did not mention reliance at all, did 
not assert an absence of reliance by Orvis or the SBA, and there is no question Johnson 
failed to preserve for appellate review any argument regarding reliance. 
Likewise, Johnson has presented nothing in this case showing he actually argued a 
bad faith/mistake element to the district court. [See id. at 42-44.] Even if Johnson had 
preserved an argument on a bad faith/mistake element, the evidence undisputedly 
showed that Johnson answered "[n]o" to the SBA's unambiguous question about whether 
he "had any interest in any partnerships." [R. 2424:18-23, Addendum Exh. 2.] Johnson 
never asked to have the question clarified, and he never changed his testimony either 
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during the deposition or after his testimony was transcribed. To the contrary7, in his 
affidavit opposing summary judgment Johnson unequivocally stated that his testimony 
before the SBA was accurate. [R. 2274, % 39, Addendum Exh. 4.] Johnson's self-
serving statements now that his sworn testimony was a mistake because he misconstrued 
the SBA's question to be only about real estate partnerships is unavailing. Such 
unsupported bald allegations are insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact for 
trial. [See supra p. 35.]22 
The bottom line is that Johnson raised no argument relative to the elements of 
reliance or bad faith/mistake before the district court, and, therefore, the Court of 
Appeals correctly held that Johnson waived any argument relative to those issues on 
appeal. 
R Johnson's "Public Policy" and "Partnership Accounting" Arguments 
Are Made For The First Time To This Court And Cannot Provide A 
Basis To Reverse The Court Of Appeals' Holding. 
The Court should reject Johnson's attempt to obtain reversal by arguing the 
application of judicial estoppel in this case would violate public policy, and that an 
accounting of the alleged Orvis-Johnson partnership should be ordered, because those 
arguments were never made to the Court of Appeals and, indeed, are asserted for the first 
~ Johnson's argument that Judge Hanson's finding of "no mistake'5 constitutes an 
improper weighing of evidence [Pet'r Br. 44.] is irrelevant because on review pursuant to 
a writ of certiorari, this Court reviews the decision by the Court of Appeals, not the ruling 
of the district Court. See Coulter & Smith. 966 P.2d 852 at 856. 
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time ever. [See generally Br. of Appellant, (Case No. 20041122-CA (on file with 
Appellate Court Clerk's Office)).] Johnson does not even attempt to contend with this 
fact. [See Pet'r Br. 45-46.] This Court's review on a writ of certiorari is limited to 
reviewing conclusions actually made by the Court of Appeals as well as issues and 
arguments actually found in the record. See Coulter & Smith. Ltd. v. Russell 966 P.2d 
852, 855-56 (Utah 1998); Qgden Cits Corp. v. Indus.Comm'n. 92 Utah 423, 423, 69 
P.2d 261 (1937) (declining, on petition for writ of certiorari, to consider argument not 
part of record). Issues must not be raised for the first time in this Court unless 
exceptional circumstances or plain error is shown. See Timm v. Dewsnup, 2003 UT 47, 
TflJ 38-39, 86 P.3d 699. Johnson presents this Court with no exceptional circumstance or 
plain error relative to these two issues, [see generally Pet'r Br. 44-46] and this Court 
should therefore disregard them. 
In addition to Johnson's lack of preservation, Johnson's arguments are wholly 
without merit. Johnson's argument that applying judicial estoppel in this case would 
violate public policy by preventing the truth of his alleged partnership interest from 
ultimately prevailing, [see Pet'r Br. 45] ignores that Johnson swore he did not have any 
partnership interest, under oath, while he was a lawyer, and that he reaffirmed the 
accuracy of that testimony in this case. Indeed, when the SB A could not collect its 
judgment based on Johnson's truthful testimony that he did not own any partnership 
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interests, public policy actually weighs in favor of preventing Johnson from burdening 
the courts and Orvis with continuing litigation predicated on the exact opposite position. 
Likewise, Johnson's argument that this Court should order an accounting of the 
alleged Orvis-Johnson partnership cannot support reversal of the Court of Appeals' 
decision because summary judgment has been granted in Orvis' favor, establishing that 
the very partnership for which Johnson seeks an accounting does not exist. Further, 
even if this Court were to reverse that judgment, before any accounting could be 
permitted, a trial would have to still be held on whether the alleged partnership exists. 
Thus, Johnson's argument for an accounting is not properly preserved, is moot, and 
misplaced and should not be considered by this Court. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, this Court should affirm the Opinion of the Court of 
Appeals. 
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